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Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control

Huang, Feng ; Chen, Xiaojie ; Wang, Long

Journal of Theoretical Biology, 14 July 2018, Vol.449, pp.60-72 [Tạp chí có phản biện]

ISSN: 0022-5193 ; E-ISSN: 1095-8541 ; DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.018

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  • Nhan đề:
    Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
  • Tác giả: Huang, Feng ; Chen, Xiaojie ; Wang, Long
  • Chủ đề: Evolutionary Game Theory ; Corrupt Punishment ; Public Goods Games ; Replicator Dynamics ; Evolutionary Game Theory ; Corrupt Punishment ; Public Goods Games ; Replicator Dynamics ; Biology
  • Là 1 phần của: Journal of Theoretical Biology, 14 July 2018, Vol.449, pp.60-72
  • Mô tả: •Power asymmetries are usually associated with hierarchies.•We investigate the evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control.•Corruption control is beneficial for the evolution of cooperation.•Asymmetrical punishment is a more effective policy in fostering public cooperation than symmetrical punishment.•The form of spiteful corruption is more effective in enhancing cooperation level than bribery. Punishment is widely recognized as a potential promoter in sustaining or even enhancing public cooperation, but it meanwhile induces the problem of second-order free-riders. Particularly, recent evidence shows that costly punishment can be maintained if punishers may engage in corruption. However, how to reduce or eliminate incidents of corruption has been the enduring conundrum in human society. As power asymmetries are associated with hierarchies, we investigate how costly punishment affects the evolution of cooperation in the cases without...
  • Ngôn ngữ: English
  • Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0022-5193 ; E-ISSN: 1095-8541 ; DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.018

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