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The Role of Subnational Politicians in Distributive Politics: Political Bias in Venezuela’s Land Reform Under Chávez

Albertus, Michael

Comparative Political Studies, November 2015, Vol.48(13), pp.1667-1710 [Tạp chí có phản biện]

ISSN: 0010-4140 ; E-ISSN: 1552-3829 ; DOI: 10.1177/0010414015600457

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  • Nhan đề:
    The Role of Subnational Politicians in Distributive Politics: Political Bias in Venezuela’s Land Reform Under Chávez
  • Tác giả: Albertus, Michael
  • Chủ đề: Political Economy ; Subnational Politics ; Political Science
  • Là 1 phần của: Comparative Political Studies, November 2015, Vol.48(13), pp.1667-1710
  • Mô tả: This article examines how the partisanship of empowered subnational politicians can affect within-district benefit distribution. I present a theory of the role of subnational politicians in distributive politics, and then test this theory on a distributive Venezuelan land reform initiative by leveraging unique individual-level data on revealed voter preferences and the receipt of particularistic benefits. Using data from a list of millions of voters who signed petitions to recall former President Chávez, I match information on recent land grant applicants to petition signers to measure how political preferences affect the likelihood of applying for and receiving land, and how state governors condition this relationship. I find evidence for both strategic core voter targeting and blockage of benefits to opposition voters. These effects, however, are modified by the political affiliation of governors. The findings point to the importance of considering how intervening subnational politicians influence distributive politics, particularly under federal structures.
  • Ngôn ngữ: English
  • Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0010-4140 ; E-ISSN: 1552-3829 ; DOI: 10.1177/0010414015600457

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