skip to main content
Ngôn ngữ:
Giới hạn tìm kiếm: Giới hạn tìm kiếm: Dạng tài nguyên Hiển thị kết quả với: Hiển thị kết quả với: Chỉ mục

Rules, communication, and collusion narrative evidence from the Sugar Institute case

Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P

The American economic review, 2001, Vol.91(3), pp. 379-398 [Tạp chí có phản biện]

ISSN: 0002-8282

Toàn văn sẵn có

Trích dẫn Trích dẫn bởi
  • Nhan đề:
    Rules, communication, and collusion narrative evidence from the Sugar Institute case
  • Tác giả: Genesove, David
  • Mullin, Wallace P
  • Chủ đề: Kartell ; Zuckerindustrie ; Usa
  • Là 1 phần của: The American economic review, 2001, Vol.91(3), pp. 379-398
  • Mô tả: Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents. (JEL L13, L41)
  • Ngôn ngữ: English
  • Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0002-8282

Đang tìm Cơ sở dữ liệu bên ngoài...