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The Evanescence of Neutrality.(Review Symposium: Culture, Equality and Recognition: A Symposium on Alan Patten's Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights)(Critical essay)

Laborde, Cecile

Political Theory, 2018, Vol.46(1), pp.99-105 [Tạp chí có phản biện]

ISSN: 0090-5917

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  • Nhan đề:
    The Evanescence of Neutrality.(Review Symposium: Culture, Equality and Recognition: A Symposium on Alan Patten's Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights)(Critical essay)
  • Tác giả: Laborde, Cecile
  • Chủ đề: Neutrality – Analysis ; College Faculty – Criticism and Interpretation ; College Faculty – Works
  • Là 1 phần của: Political Theory, 2018, Vol.46(1), pp.99-105
  • Mô tả: In this short commentary, I draw on Alan Patten's chapter about liberal neutrality in Equal Recognition, as well as the companion paper "Three Theories of Religious Liberty," to argue that neutrality has a well-defined, yet limited, place in liberal theory, particularly in relation to controversies about the rights of religious citizens. I suggest that neutrality becomes evanescent the closer we get to hard cases of religious recognition and accommodation. Alan Patten defends neutrality as a constraint on the pursuit of perfectionist policies. A liberal state has a strong (if defeasible) reason not favour one conception of the good over another, and this reason is grounded in respect for people's fair opportunity for self-determination (henceforth FOSD). The state should not favour one rival good over another out of respect for people's interest in pursuing the conception of the good they hold. The conception of neutrality Patten favours is what he calls neutrality of treatment. Neutrality of treatment improves both on neutrality of impact and justification. For example, it can explain why some intuitively non-neutral policy, such as religious establishment, is wrong even though it cane be justified neutrally (ER, 113). Patten argues that neutrality demands that the state give equal treatment to different conceptions of the good-Christianity and Islam, cricket and softball, to use his favourite examples. The state maintains neutrality between rival conceptions when, relative to an appropriate baseline, its policies are equally accommodating of those conceptions-without however equalizing outputs or impact (ER, 115).
  • Ngôn ngữ: English
  • Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0090-5917

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